EMPOWERMENT OF WHISTLEBLOWERS – PART – II

The first part of this article was published on 14th March 2010. To read the full article Click Here.
Public Interest Disclosure (Protection of Information) Bill - 2010

It is heartening to know, after a long wait of around seven years of the first brutal killing of an engineer Mr. Satyendra Dubey in November 2003, who had blew the whistle in the case of unbridled corruption in NHAI’s Golden Quadrilateral project, and two years later by atrocious killing of an IOC officer Mr. Manjunath Shanmugam and to present many other Right to Information activists by anti-socials and vested interests; that the Cabinet has recently cleared the Public Interest Disclosure (Protection of Information) Bill - 2010, and is likely to be tabled during ongoing session of the Parliament.

India all these years does not have any law to protect and reward whistleblowers. Several countries worldwide have already put in place laws to protect whistleblowers. However, the level of protection and the way in which the law operates differs from country to country. For instance, the US was one of the earliest to have the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, while the UK has the Public Interest Disclosure Act of 1998, and Norway has a similar law in place since January 2007.

Shockingly, the issue of protection of whistleblower in India had been dragging for all these years, as the country leisurely debated and struggled with the problem of resolving the contradiction of a whistleblower’s law with the provisions of the Official Secrets Act; unfortunately the whistleblowers continued to be atrociously coerced, intimidated, threatened, victimized, and being cruelly killed in retaliation by the perpetuators of frauds, powerful, imperious and Machiavellians individuals and company heads/CEOs, mafias, to satiate their unbridled greed. In the latest incident of last month, activist Mr. Amit Jethwa was shot outside the high court in Ahmedabad, while he had exposed illegal mining in the Gir forest area in the state of Gujarat.

The proposed law has provisions to prevent victimization or disciplinary action against those who expose corruption in the government and will cover central, state and public sector employees. As per the bill, the onus will be on the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), who would be designated as the competent authority for complaints, would have the powers of a civil court, including powers to summon anybody, order police investigation and provide security to the whistleblower and to protect the identity of the citizens who provide information about the misuse of governmental authority and funds. It is expected to encourage disclosure of information in public interest. According to the bill, if a person making a disclosure is victimized and his or her identity is revealed, the whistleblower’s superiors will be held liable. There are provisions for a fine and other penalties — a punishment is set at up to 3 years in prison or a fine of up to Rs. 50,000 or both; if a whistleblower is found to be “punished” for exposing wrongdoing. These penalties and imprisonments could possibly have been higher so as to have efficacy of high deterrence, along the lines of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and Dodd- Frank Act-2010.

However, the proposed law neither has provisions for encouraging whistle blowing by providing for financial incentives; nor deals with corporate whistleblowers and does not extend its jurisdiction to the private sector. India Inc ought to have learned lessons after the experience of the massive fraud at Satyam as was outlined in my article: “Satyam Lessons and Corporate Governance Reforms”. To read the full article Click here.

“Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act -2010”

The recently enacted “Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act -2010” in USA, however, creates an elaborate new system of financial incentives to encourage whistleblowers to come forward to the SEC with information about securities law violations.

The new incentive offered to whistleblowers in this Act is the opportunity to obtain a substantial cash reward in the event that information they provide leads to an enforcement action in which the SEC obtains a monetary sanction (defined to include penalties, disgorgement and interest) totaling at least $1 million. The Section 922 provides that the SEC “shall pay an award” to the whistleblower of between 10 and 30 percent of the monetary sanctions imposed in the SEC enforcement action

Awards payments are to be made from a newly created “Securities and Exchange Commission Investor Protection Fund.” The Fund is to be built up (to a ceiling of $300 million) by depositing monetary sanctions obtained by the Commission in its enforcement actions generally, to the extent that those funds are not distributed to victims. In addition to paying awards to whistleblowers, this $300 million will also be available to fund the activities of the SEC’s Inspector General.

The Section 922 also provides significantly enhanced remedies for whistleblowers who believe they have suffered retaliation by their employers, including expanded private rights of action and the ability to obtain awards of back pay. In view of these provisions, the Act will allow as most effective deterrent for companies to prevent any mistreatment of whistleblowers. Strong protections for whistleblowers will be more important than ever, in light of the anti-retaliation provisions of Section 922.

In the post-Enron era, whistle blowing – the act of exposing fraud, waste, abuse or other misbehavior in a company or organization – is on the rise. In the United States, for example, more than US $8 billion has been recovered as a direct result of whistleblowers’ actions. Whistle blowing can be an effective tool to deter and detect corruption both in the private and public sectors and it provides better information flows, which increase the chances of successful prosecutions in corruption cases. But in order for whistle blowing to be an effective tool to fight corruption, legislation and clear processes are essential.

The whistle blowing, as an internal control mechanism is yet to come of age in our country. Whistle blowing, in India, still continues to be perceived by many as acts; which are not constructive, a matter of personal vendetta or revenge, intention to embarrass the organization, and so on so forth. On the other hand, the whistleblowers have often faced reprisal, greatly suffered and endured, often for many years, after the complaints have gone unheeded. One of the reasons attributable to this is poor levels of confidence in the ability of the legal and regulatory environment to ensure promised protection against retaliation.

For developing a better governance practices in the country, it is imperative to empower and encourage the whistle blowers, the policy concerning them need to be comprehensive rather than applicable to one set of people only and be made mandatory for one and all, with clear guidelines for prosecuting intimidation of or retaliation against the complainants, including imposition of fines/ penalties for frivolous or mischievous complaints and fast-track disposal of cases.

References: Whistleblower Bill 2010 http://persmin.nic.in/EmployeesCorner/Acts_Rules/DisclosureBill/DisclosureBill_2010_Eng.pdf

Bernard Madoff's Ponzi Scheme

Is it a case of hamstrung by bureaucracy, inexperienced investigators, misjudgment, improprieties or much more to it?

In a blistering Executive summary report posted on SEC’s web site on 2nd September 2009 by US SEC’s inspector general, states that the regulators missed “numerous” red flags that had led to Madoff‘s $65 billion Ponzi scheme and never did a “thorough and competent” probe despite complaints dating to 1992.

In spite of five probes and having caught Madoff in “lies and misrepresentations” SEC failed to follow up on inconsistencies. But for Madoff’s self confession of the crime in December 2008, the regulators would have never ever found out. The financial crisis has exposed many breakdowns in regulation, but none has involved such a large fraud by a single person.

The laxity of regulator in discharging duties for around one and half decades had only encouraged the fraudster to continue the crime audaciously for such a long period. The fraud left thousands of clients, including charities, retirees and celebrities, devastated. Such failures are unpardonable and do not act as deterrent.

Click Here to read the Executive Summary Report
Click Here to Read Full Report

Satyam Lessons and Corporate Governance Reforms

“The directors (managers) of such companies, however, being managers of other people’s money than their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private co-partnery frequently watch over their own… Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail more or less in the management of the affairs of such a company.”

• Adam Smith - An Inquiry into “The Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations”, p.31.


INTRODUCTION

The Corporate Governance, has never ever, since the Satyam Episode, become such a household word. A confessional letter of 7th January 2009 from Mr. Ramalinga Raju, founder Chairman of Satyam, divulged the accounting scam of the order of US $ 1.6 billion, and shook the whole country with tremors felt throughout the globe. Mr. Ramalinga Raju can be credited as the only corporate fraudster to have admitted his misdemeanors – fudging of accounts, inflated revenues, non-existing profits, and the fraudulent bank deposits and audaciously sustaining it for seven long years. The Mr. Ramalinga Raju’s misdeeds, unfortunately had given negative publicity of India Inc so far a positive story. The fraud has undermined the trust in the government, companies, and markets alike. In India, nobody had ever imagined anything to go wrong at Satyam, one of India’s best known IT companies, which ironically had received the Golden Peacock Award for Corporate Governance in 2008.

This episode has led to debates in India, about some of inadequacies in the corporate governance norms. Questions have been raised about the performance/ effectiveness of board of directors, roles of auditors, the impact of regulations, disclosures, etc. However, the silver lining to this whole episode was the proactive role played first time ever in India by the shareholder activists in opposing the unanimously approved board’s resolution of December 16, 2008, in acquiring a property of companies (Matyas Properties and Maytas Infra) owned by the son of Mr. Ramalinga Raju, which led to revelation of frauds being committed by promoter behind the scene. If a large company like Satyam could do it for years, what’s the guarantee more are not doing it? It is therefore, important that the Satyam fraud needs to investigated and sentence the fraudsters swiftly and harshly to increase 'deterrent aspects’.

The frauds of such magnitudes provide a good opportunity for introspection. These times also expose the shortcomings and vulnerabilities of the system. Conflicts always have hidden solutions. There are lessons to be learnt from Satyam’s nemesis too. It is one such great opportunity to reassess some of the existing framework on corporate governance, systems for better enforcements of regulations; effective roles and duties of directors, executives, regulators; ethics in businesses and empowerment of minority shareholders.

OVERVIEW OF INDIAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

India’s corporate governance codes are on par with the best in the world, the importance of continuing to assess it against international best practice, to suit to the Indian ethos & culture with utmost sincerity and keenness in enforcement has been highlighted by the recent fraud at Satyam.

The Indian corporate would appreciate the fact that the corporate governance in India has not been forced upon them by the government, but it was a voluntary and path-breaking initiative from the Indian industries association - Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). It was necessitated, for the fact that India Inc was to move forward and globalize itself towards international standards in terms of disclosure of information by the corporate sector and, through all of this, to develop a high level of public confidence in business and industry in the process of building large global conglomerates. CII had vigorously lobbied and pressurized the government of India for its implementation.

Corporate governance initiatives in India began in 1998 with the “Desirable Code of Corporate Governance” – a voluntary code published by the CII, and the first formal regulatory framework for listed companies specifically for corporate governance, established by the SEBI, widely known as Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement – Aimed at improving corporate governance in the country. The latter was implemented in February 2000, following the recommendations of the Kumarmangalam Birla Committee Report.

Legal reforms has been ongoing, with SEBI in 2003 revised the Clause 49, as per the recommendations put forward by the committee and public comments received. Subsequently, the SEBI received a number of feedbacks/ representations, which were deliberated once again by the Narayana Murthy Committee and post discussion, SEBI directed further amendment to the Clause 49 in October, 2004. The amendment to Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement has been the topic of elaborate deliberations and discussions in the Indian corporate scene. The difficulties in achieving compliance prompted many apex chambers of commerce to appeal for an extension of the extended deadline of 31 December 2005, without success. The ease with which SEBI introduced mandatory corporate governance standards in India is unparallel.

The Companies Act, 1956 was undoubtedly a significant landmark in the development of Company Law in India. It consisted of 658 sections and fourteen schedules. The Act was enacted with the object of amending and consolidating the law relating to Companies and certain other associations. The main object of the Act was to provide protection to investors, creditors and public at large and at the same time leaving management free to utilize its resources and energies for the optimum output. However, the working of the Companies Act brought to light several lacunae and defects in its provisions. Therefore, the Act was amended from time to time. But despite extensive changes the principal Act still suffers from certain serious defects. Moreover, after liberalization, the increasing number of options and avenues for international business, trade and capital flows had necessitated modernization of the regulatory structure for the corporate sector in a comprehensive manner.

In 2004, the Indian Government took up a comprehensive review of the Companies Act, 1956. The aim was to strengthen compliance norms and to provide a governance structure for unlisted firms. The new Companies Bill has been based on best international practices and fosters entrepreneurship. As a result the Union Cabinet on 29th August 2008 gave its approval for introduction of the Companies Bill, 2008 in the Parliament to replace the Companies Act, 1956, the existing statute for regulation of companies in the country and considered to be in need of comprehensive revision in view of the changing economic and commercial environment nationally as well as internationally. The bill had lapsed with the dissolution of the house in December 2008 and it has now been re-introduced on 3rd August, 2009. The Companies Bill seeks to enable the corporate sector in India to operate in a regulatory environment of best international practices. The provisions of Companies Bill are broadly considered to be suitable for addressing various contemporary issues relating to corporate governance, including those recently noticed during the investigation into the affairs of erstwhile Satyam.

The bill has now been re-christened as Companies Bill 2009, and will be forwarded to a Parliamentary Standing Committee for recommendations. With the standing committee set with no time frame for giving its recommendations, the passage of the new law is likely to take over a year. It is quite sad that the amendment of the Company Act 1956 has been languishing for so many years now. It is earnestly hoped that speedy passage of the Companies Bill will now be ensured.

LESSONS FROM SATYAM EPISODE

The Satyam board on December 16, 2008, had unanimously approved a proposal to acquire 100 percent of closely held Maytas Properties for Rs 6,240 crore ($ 1.3 billion) and 51 percent of Maytas Infra for Rs 1440 crore ($300 million). The latter acquisition was proposed to be done in two stages: first, Satyam would acquire 31 percent from the promoters at Rs 475 a share, and in the second, it would buy another 20 percent from the market through an open offer at Rs 525. The two acquisitions would have totals expenditures of Rs 7680 crore ($1.6 million).

The immediate reaction of institutional shareholders and investment analyst, as soon as the information become public the next day, was that it was daylight robbery and the promoters were siphoning money out of Satyam. They further vehemently reacted and said that they would to go to any length to prevent this from happening. Mr. Ramalinga Raju was left with no option to abandon the plan at the first place, but also had to put in his papers, confessing cooking of the books for several years, on 7th January 2009, sending shockwave all throughout the corporate board. However, the silver lining to this whole episode was the ascendancy of the Shareholders Activism, one of the first times ever in India. But for the proactive role played by the shareholders and the institutional investors, the nefarious activities committed clandestinely by promoters would not have seen the light of the day.

In the Indian context, it is well known that the many of the companies are controlled by the families and would like these to be handed over to their sons and daughters. The promoters may pursue interests that are not necessarily desirable from the point of view of the commercial success of the company. The promoters are all powerful making even the academically well qualified Independent Directors, as in the case of Satyam having people like; Vinod K Dham, Mendu Rammohan Rao, Krishna G Palepu, Mangalam Srinivasan…, appear dwarfs and not of independence. This has brought to attention once again the role of the independent directors.

As a consequence of the fallout, all the independent directors resigned one after another. These included Mangalam Srinivasan, Vinod K Dham, Krishna G Palepu, T R Prasad, Prof. V S Raju and M Rammohan Rao.

It is one thing to have elaborate codes, but quite another for companies to follow them in letter and spirit. Yet another is the question of enforcement if companies do not adhere to the standards. Weakness of enforcement in India is a real issue. The unraveling of these events at Satyam has once again put spotlight on some of the corporate governance practices and has exposed the following weaknesses:

1. Lax Regulatory systems
2. The imperious and Machiavellians promoters/ CEOs and their unbridled greed
3. Connivance and collusion of Auditors and poor auditing practices
4. Timid and acquiescent independent directors
5. Shareholders activism and Empowerment of minority shareholders
6. Empowerment of Whistle blowers

We ought to refrain from taking quick-fix regulatory measures. It would be worthwhile to search for holistic solutions to these issues; which are relevant in the Indian context. The choice of changes in the regulatory frame work should be compatible with the country’s own values and legal system. The system adopted should be agile enough to fore warn the early signals of a brewing crisis and take corrective measures. The system should encourage “proactiveness” rather than be a "reactionary", otherwise status will not change. With the present day state of art computer technologies, this is not impossible.

One must, however, understand that no matter how strong a regulatory system is, it cannot always prevent frauds. Despite the enormous increase of disclosures and stringent risk management systems in US post the Sarbanes Oxley Act, inability of the system to read the early sign of impending recent Subprime crisis, Madoff's Ponzi scheme, and willingness to take corrective action is one such example. Moreover, strong measures often lead to expensive regulations and defiance. There are limits to legislations as a lot depends on the integrity and ethical values of various corporate players such as directors, promoters, executives and shareholders. The key lies in management decisions and its commitment to establish and follow rigorous governance systems. The implementation must be in the letter and spirit, and one should recognize the responsibility of the company towards its stakeholders.